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ABSTRACT
Growth theory can go a long way toward accounting for phenomena linked with U.S. economic
development. Some examples are: 
(i) the secular decline in fertility between 1800 and 1980, 
(ii) the decline in agricultural employment and the rise in skill since 1800, 
(iii) the demise of child labor starting around 1900, 
(iv) the increase in female labor-force participation from 1900 to 1980, 
(v) the baby boom from 1936 to 1972. 
Growth theory models are presented to address all of these facts. The analysis emphasizes the role
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21 Introduction
Life in the 1800’s: Imagine living as a typical American child in the nineteenth century.
You have six brothers and/or sisters. You live in a house, outside of an urban area, with
no running water, no central heating, and no electricity. Your father labors 70 hours a
week in the agricultural economy. Your mother probably puts in about the same amount of
time doing work at home. Less than half of your years between the ages of 5 and 20 will be
devoted to school. So, perhaps you are playing in the family kitchen that contains a cast iron
range, a table, and a dresser. But, more likely you are helping your parents by doing one of
a litany of chores: carrying wood or water into the house, washing clothes on a scrub board
or ironing them with a ﬂat iron, looking after younger siblings, preparing meals, cleaning
the house, making clothes, tending crops or animals, etc. In this era, household production
is an incredibly labor-intensive process. What changed this situation? The catalyst for the
ensuing economic transformation to modern day life was technological progress, both in the
market and at home, or so it will be argued here.
1.1 Technological Progress in the Market
Fertility: Over the period from 1830 to 1990 real wages increased by a factor of 9 — see
Figure 1.1 This rise was propelled by a near 7-fold increase in market-sector total factor
productivity (TFP) between 1800 and 1990. Such tremendous technological advance had a
dramatic impact on everyday life. As an example, consider the eﬀect that economic progress
could have had on fertility. Raising children takes time. A secular increase in real wages
implies that the opportunity cost of having a child, when measured in terms of market goods,
will rise. The utility value of an extra unit of market consumption relative to an extra child
should fall, however, as market goods become more abundant with economic development.
So long as the marginal utility of market goods falls by less than the increase in real wages
fertility should decline. And so fertility did decline, from 7 kids per woman in 1800 to 2
1 The data sources used in Figure 1 are given in Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2002)









































































Figure 1: Technological Progress in the Market and Fertility
today.
Industrialization and Skilled Labor: At the start of the 1800’s America was largely a rural
economy. Over seventy percent of workers were employed in agriculture — see Figure 2.2
Less than 50 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 20 went to school. From 1800
to1940 technological advance in the nonagricultural sector of the U.S. economy was twice
as fast as in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, agricultural goods had a lower income
elasticity than nonagricultural ones. These two facts together implied that the demand for
labor in the nonagricultural sector of the economy rose relative to the demand for labor in
the agricultural sector. Since the nonagricultural sector required a more skill-intensive labor
force than did the agricultural sector, the demand for skilled labor rose too.
Child Labor: Children formed an important part of the labor force in the nineteenth
century. Exact numbers are hard to come by, though. First, the data before 1870 is scarce.
Lebergott (1964, p. 50) reports that 43 percent of textile workers in Massachusetts around
2 The enrollment rate ﬁgures come from Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to
1970 (1975, Series H 433). See Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) for the sources of the other data plotted in
Figure 2.














































































Figure 2: The Decline in Agriculture and the Rise in Skilled Labor
1820 were children, as were 47 and 55 percent in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Second, the
available ﬁgures pertain to paid labor. These statistics omit the labors of children on family
farms and businesses, or around the home — the same is true for the housewives of the era.
The incidence of child labor rose until 1900, as Table 1 shows. At that time children made
up about 20 percent of the paid labor force. It then began to decline. By 1930 child labor
had vanished.
A reasonable hypothesis is that technological progress reduced the need for unskilled labor
in agriculture and manufacturing. Take agriculture, for example, where the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries saw massive improvements in agricultural technology. Two of
the most important inventions were the horse-drawn harvester in the mid-nineteenth century
and the tractor that began to diﬀuse into American farms in the early twentieth century.
Mechanization of farms virtually eliminated the need for raw labor: In 1830, it would take a
farmer 250-300 hours to grow 100 bushels of wheat; in 1890, 40-50 hours with the help of a
horse-drawn machine; in 1930, 15-20 hours with a tractor; and in 1975, 3-4 hours with large
tractors and combines.3
3Table 1: Children aged 10-15 as Percentage of the Gainfully Employed
Year All Occupations Agriculture Manufacturing Mining
1870 13.2 9.3 5.6 7.1
1880 16.8 11.6 6.7
1890 18.1 11.5 2.8
1900 18.2 11.4 3.2 2.1
1910 15.0 9.8 2.4 0.8
1920 11.3 8.0 1.3 (<1.0)
1930 4.7 3.3 (<1.0) (<1.0)
Source: Lebergott (1964, p. 53)
1.2 Technological Progress in the Home
Female Labor-Force Participation: Just as the last 200 years have witnessed technological
progress in the market sector, they have witnessed tremendous technological advance in the
home sector. Since productivity numbers are not computed for the home sector, given the
elusive nature of output and inputs, the evidence on technological progress is circumstantial.
The household sector in the American economy was basically a cottage industry until the
dawning of the Second Industrial Revolution. With the onset of the electric age a host of
new appliances were ushered in: washing machines, refrigerators, etc. It took time for these
new capital goods to diﬀuse through the economy, as Figure 3 shows.4 A tt h es a m et i m e ,
the principles of scientiﬁc management were being applied to everyday household tasks. The
large table and isolated dresser that characterized a kitchen of the 1800’s were replaced by
continuous countertops and built-in cabinets. This wave of technological progress in the
home freed up tremendous amounts of labor — see Figure 3. The time spent on housework
fell from 58 hours per week in 1900 to just 18 in 1975. Married women could now enter the
labor force, and they did in droves.
3 Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, http://www.usda.gov/history2/text4.htm.
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Figure 3: Technological Progress in the Home and Female Labor-Force Participation
Fertility: Technological progress in the household sector could also have had implications
for fertility. Labor-saving household goods that ease the burden of housework will lower the
cost of raising children. Fertility should rise. In fact it did, between 1936 and 1957 fertility
increased by 53 percent — see Figure 1.
1.3 The Goal
The goal here is to persuade you that standard Solow (1956) -cum- Ramsey (1928) growth
theory can be fruitfully employed to explain these phenomena. Speciﬁcally, all of these facts
can be accounted for by modifying the standard growth paradigm to incorporate fertility
decisions, household production, human capital investment in children, labor-force partic-
ipation, and multiple sectors. It will be argued that technological progress is the engine
driving economic transformation. A selective review of the literature is provided in Section
7.
52T h e B a b y B u s t a n d B a b y B o o m
Two facts stand out about the fertility of American women. First, it has dropped drastically
over the last two hundred years. This decline is called the demographic transition, but will
be labeled here the baby bust. Second, the secular decline in fertility has had only one
interruption, the baby boom. These two facts can easily be accounted for within the context
of the neoclassical growth model. Just two modiﬁcations to the standard model are required:
a fertility decision needs to be added, and household production incorporated.
2.1 The Environment
Imagine a small open economy populated by overlapping generations.5 People live for three
periods, one period as children and two as adults. Young adults are endowed with one unit
of time. They can use this time for either working or raising kids. An adult is fecund only
in the ﬁrst period of his life. Old agents are retired.
Tastes: The lifetime utility function for a young adult is given by
φln(c
y + c)+βφln(c
o0)+( 1+β)(1 − φ)lnn
y,( 1 )
where cy and co0 denote the adult’s consumption when young and old, and ny represents
t h en u m b e ro fk i d st h a th ew o u l dl i k et oh a v ew h e ny o u n g .T h ec o n s t a n tc proxies for the
household production of market goods. As will be seen, it plays an important role in the
analysis.
Income: Young agents work for the market wage w. They save for old age at the
internationally determined time-invariant gross interest rate r.






where ly is the time a young adult devotes to raising children and x is the level of productivity
5 The model presented here is based on Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2002).






The cost of raising children is directly proportional to the wage rate.






















which can be rewritten as
c
o0 = βr(c
y + c). (3)
This equation simply states that consumption of market goods over the household’s lifetime
will grow at the (gross) rate βr. If the gross rate of interest, r, exceeds the gross rate of
time preference, 1/β, consumption increases over the household’s lifetime, and likewise will
decline when r<1/β.
The above optimization problem can be reformulated using (3) to appear as
max
cy,ny{(1 + β)[φln(c











1/(1−γ) + c].( 5 )













The righthand side of this equation gives the marginal beneﬁt from having an extra kid. The
lefthand side represents the marginal cost. This is the product of two components. Having
7an extra child necessitates working less in the market. This will lead to a sacriﬁce in terms
of market consumption in the amount [(1+β)(1−γ)]−1wx−1/(1−γ)(ny)γ/(1−γ).T h em a r g i n a l
utility derived from an extra unit of consumption is φ/(cy + c).





where k and l are the inputs of capital and labor used in production and z is the level of
productivity in the market sector. Now, suppose that capital depreciates fully after use in
production. The rental rate on capital will then be r, since it must yield the same return as





1−α − rk − wl}.
The ﬁrst-order conditions connected to this problem are
αzk
α−1l




−α = w. (8)
These ﬁrst-order conditions simply state that each factor gets paid its marginal product.
By substituting equation (7) into (8), it is easy to see that




Hence, the wage rate, w, is determined by the level of market productivity, z,a n dt h e
international rate of return on capital, r.
Population Growth:L e tsy and so stand for the current sizes of the young and old adult
populations, respectively. Since today’s young generation will be tomorrow’s old generation
it must transpire that
s
o0 = s
y,( 1 0 )
8w h e r eap r i m ea ﬃxed to a variable denotes its value next period. Now, each young adult






Lemma 1 Fertility, ny, decreases with market wages, w, and increases with technological
advance in the home sector, x.










(1 + β)(1 − γ)(1 − φ)
φ
.
Plugging the above equation into the budget constraint (5) yields
c












The proof is now complete since it’s trivial to see that ny is decreasing in w, and increasing
in x.
Intuition: With the aid of some diagrams, it’s easy to ferret out the intuition underlying
the above lemma. First, observe that (5) speciﬁes the consumption possibilities frontier








γ/(1−γ)/[(1 + β)(1 − γ)] ≤ 0. (14)
This is shown in Figure 4 by the concave consumption possibilities frontier, labeled PP.
The frontier hits the vertical axis at the point cy + c =[ w + c]/(1 + β), and the horizontal


















Figure 4: The Determination of Fertility
The objective function (4) deﬁnes indiﬀerence curves over the various (ny,c y +c) combi-
nations. The slope of an indiﬀerence curve is given by
d(cy + c)




ny ≤ 0.( 1 5 )
The equilibrium level of fertility and market consumption are shown in standard fashion by
the point (ny∗,c y∗+c) where the indiﬀerence curve is tangent to the consumption possibilities
frontier — see Figure 4.
Let wages increase by a factor of λ and assume that c =0 . In response, the consumption
possibilities frontier will rotate upwards from the curve PP,b yaf a c t o ro fλ,t ot h ep o s i t i o n
shown by the curve P0P — see Figure 5. Thus, there is a positive income eﬀect associated
with an increase in wages. The slope of the consumption possibilities curve will increase by
af a c t o ro fλ at any ny point, too, as is evident from (14). That is, the marginal cost of
an extra child rises. This eﬀect should operate to reduce fertility. It’s easy to deduce that
consumption, cy, will move up by a factor of λ and that fertility, ny, will remain constant.
This transpires because the substitution and income eﬀects on fertility from an increase in
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Figure 5: The Eﬀect of an Increase in Wages on Fertility when c =0
To see this, note that along any vertical line the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves increase in
proportion with the increases in cy, as is clear from (15). The slope of the indiﬀerence curve
at the point (ny∗,λc y∗) is higher by a factor of exactly λ relative to the slope of the curve at
the point (ny∗,c y∗).
Now suppose that wages jump up by a factor of λ and assume that c > 0. The consump-
tion possibilities frontier no longer shifts upwards in a proportional manner. The horizontal
intercept now shifts in — see Figure 6. A higher wage rate implies that the household pro-
duction of market goods, c, now frees up less time for kids. As can be seen, fertility must
unambiguously fall from ny∗ to ny∗0. Why? Suppose that fertility remains ﬁxed at its old
level, ny∗, and that consumption once again rises by a factor of λ,s a yf r o mcy∗ to λcy∗.( N o t e
that cy∗ and λcy∗ are not labeled on the diagram.) The slope of the consumption possibilities
frontier will once again increase by a factor of λ, in line with (14). The slope of the indiﬀer-
ence curve through the point (ny∗,λc y∗+c) will increase by less, though, due to the presence
of the c term in preferences — see (15) and the dashed indiﬀerence curve in Figure 6. Hence,


















Figure 6: The Eﬀect of Wages on Fertility when c 6=0
[(1 − φ)/φ](λcy∗ +c)/ny∗ units of consumption. According to his production possibilities he
can get λw(1/x)1/(1−γ)(ny∗)γ/(1−γ)/[(1 + β)(1 − γ)] units of consumption for an incremental
cut in fertility. Now, [(1−φ)/φ](λcy∗+c)/ny∗ <λ w (1/x)1/(1−γ)(ny∗)γ/(1−γ)/[(1+β)(1−γ)],
since [(1 − φ)/φ](cy∗ + c)/ny∗ = w(1/x)1/(1−γ)(ny∗)γ/(1−γ)/[(1 + β)(1 − γ)].T h e r e f o r e , h e
should cut his level of fertility. In other words, when c > 0 the substitution eﬀect from an
increase in w outweighs the income eﬀect.
Last, consider the eﬀect of technological progress in the household sector. An increase
in x shifts the consumption possibilities frontier outwards in the manner shown by Figure
7( f r o mPP to PP0). At any ny point the consumption possibilities curve becomes less
steep since the consumption cost of an extra kid falls. As a result, both the income and
substitution eﬀects operate to increase fertility. (Since kids are a normal good, as one moves
upwards along any vertical line the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves increase. This implies
that the new consumption point must lie to right of ny.)
Corollary Fertility, ny, is decreasing in the level of market productivity, z. (Fertility is















Figure 7: The Eﬀect of an Improvement in Household Technology on Fertility











The desired result is now immediate6 .
T h eB a b yB u s t : Now, suppose that market productivity is advancing over time at the
constant rate z0/z = ζ>1. Wages must be growing at the constant rate ζ
1/(1−α) > 1,a
fact evident from (9). Assume that there is no technological progress in the home sector.
Fertility declines monotonically over time, as is immediate from (13). Since w is growing















6 The intuition is obvious since w, the wage rate, is increasing in z and decreasing in r.
13Using (10) and (11) it is easy to see that the long-run growth rate of the population can be
expressed as
sy0 + so0
sy + so =
nysy + sy
sy + sy/ny =
ny +1
1+1 /ny = n
y.
Hence, in the long-run the population may grow or shrink depending on the value of x.
Example 1 (Fertility, 1800 and 1940) Assign the following parameter values to the model:
(i) Tastes: β =0 .9420, φ =0 .47, c =2 .97.
(ii) Technology α =0 .33, γ =0 .33, r =1 /β.
Normalize the level of market and home productivity for the year 1800 to be unity. That is,
set x = z =1 .0 for 1800. With this conﬁguration of parameter values, equation (16) predicts
that the level of fertility per adult should be 3.5, exactly the value observed in the U.S. in
1800 — at that time a married couple experienced 7 births on average. Now, between 1800
and 1940 market productivity grew by a factor of 3.5. So, reset z to equal 3.5 for 1940. The
model predicts that fertility should fall to 1.2. It actually fell to 1.1.
The Baby Boom:O n c ea g a i np r e s u m et h a tm a r k e tp r o d u c t i v i t yi sg r o w i n go v e rt i m ea t
the constant rate z0/z = ζ>1. Now imagine that a once-and-for-all jump in household
productivity happens. According to (13), fertility will jump up on this account. After this
innovation fertility will revert back to its old time path of monotonic decline.
Example 2 (Fertility, 1960 and 2000) Keep the parameter values from the previous ex-
ample. U.S. fertility per prime-age adult (males plus females) rose from 1.1 to 1.8 between
1940 and 1960. This was the baby boom. By 1960 market-sector TFP had risen to 4.9, so
now reset z =4 .9 for 1960. Using (16) it is easy to deduce that a fertility rate of 1.8 can
be obtained by letting x =1 .8. That is, the baby boom can be generated by assuming that
household-sector productivity grew by a factor 1.8 between 1940 and 1960. Finally, U.S.
TFP had risen to 7.4 by the year 2000. The model predicts that the fertility rate should be
1.5, as opposed to the observed rate of 1.0.
3 The U.S. Demographic Transition
At the start of the nineteenth century most adult males worked in the agricultural sector and
children got very little in the way of a formal education. By the end of the twentieth century
almost no adult worked in agriculture, at least relative to nonagriculture. The average child
got about 13 years of formal education. To address these facts, a two-sector version of the
standard neoclassical growth model will employed. One sector will represent agriculture,
14the other manufacturing. Agriculture hires unskilled workers while manufacturing employs
skilled ones. In the framework developed, parents will decide upon both the number of chil-
dren to have and the level of education for their oﬀspring. The idea is that as manufacturing
expands relative to agriculture, the demand for skilled labor rises. This entices parents to
provide more education for their children. Since education is costly, they choose to have less
kids too.
3.1 The Environment
Take the setup of the previous section with two slight modiﬁcations.7 First, assume that
parents now care about the quality of their children in addition to the quantity of them.
Second, suppose that there are two production sectors in the economy. One sector uses
solely skilled labor, the other only unskilled workers. A unit of skilled labor earns the wage
v, while a unit of unskilled labor gets w. A parent must choose the skill level to endow his
oﬀspring with (or the quality of his children).









with 0 ≤ h0 ≤ 1. This utility function is identical to (1), with two modiﬁcations. First, the
children’s skill level, h0, now enters into the utility function. Other things equal, a parent
would prefer to have skilled children because they will earn a higher wage when they grow
up than unskilled children; i.e., v0 >w 0. In particular, a child’s labor earnings are a weighted
average of next period’s skilled and unskilled wage rates, w0(1−h0)+v0h0,w h e r et h ew e i g h t
on the skilled wage rate is the child’s skill level. Second, the constant term c in (1) is now
deleted. This term is responsible for getting fertility to fall as wages rise in the previous
model — see (13). The current setup will rely instead on a quantity-quality tradeoﬀ in raising
children to generate the decline in fertility.
7 The model presented below is a simpliﬁed version of Greenwood and Seshadri (2002). Some aspects of
the framework also bear a resemblance to Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Fernandez-Villaverde (2001).
15Output: Suppose that consumption goods can be made using one of two production








In the above expressions ou and os are the levels of output produced by the primitive and
modern technologies, and s and u are the inputs of skilled and unskilled labor. Both tech-
nologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale. For simplicity, assume that each young adult
owns a ﬁrm that can operate one or both of these technologies — hence the number of ﬁrms
in the economy is the same as the number of young adults.








0)[(1 − h)w + hv + π]. (18)
There are two types of costs associated with having children, connected with birth, τ,a n d
education, φ. These costs of having kids are expressed as fractions of family income. The
young adult’s skill level is represented by h (versus h0 for his children). Since each young
adult owns one of each type of production function he earns the proﬁts, π, associated with
operating them. Family income is (1 − h)w + hv + π. The cost of having ny children, plus
providing each of them with the human capital level h0,i s(τny +φnyh0)[(1−h)w+hv +π].

























y =( 1− τn
y − φn
yh
0)[(1 − h)w + hv + π]/(1 + β).
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ny and h0 (after solving out for cy)a r e
ψ(τ + φh0)






(1 − τny − φnyh0)
=
χ(v0 − w0)
w0(1 − h0)+v0h0. (22)












In other words, tomorrow’s skill premium is a constant, pinned down by the proportional
costs for birth and education. Note that this follows directly from the assumption that
quantity and quality have same weight χ in the utility function.

















The proﬁts earned by a young agent from operating these ﬁrms will be π = πu + πs.
17Population Growth:L e tsy and so stand for the current sizes of the young and old adult
populations, respectively. The manner in which these populations evolve is exactly the same
as that in Section 2 and is given by equations (10) and (11) — from here on out ny will be
replaced by n.
Labor Market Clearing Conditions: The markets for unskilled labor and skilled labor
must clear each period. Consequently, the equations
u =( 1− h),
and
s = h, (26)
hold.
Equilibrium: Using these two market clearing condition in the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions
(24) and (25) yields





Substituting equations (27) and (28) into (23) gives a single equation determining the human












The righthand side implicitly represents the demand for skilled labor in the manufacturing
sector.8 The lefthand side speciﬁes the supply of skilled labor available by freeing up
8 It comes from (28), which implies that
h0 =( z0/v0)1/(1−σ).
As can be seen, the demand for skilled labor h0 is decreasing in the skilled wage, v0.
18workers from agriculture.9 This equation can be solved to get a closed-form expression for





where ω ≡ [τ/(τ + φ)]1/(σ−1) > 1.
3.2 Analysis
Now, imagine that the economy is resting in a steady state where z0 and x0 are constant. It is
then easy to see from (30) that h0 will be constant. Notice that if z0 and x0 were to increase
at the same rate, h0 would also remain unchanged. This result follows because identical
increases in total factor productivity in both sectors leave unchanged the demand for each
type of labor, given the constancy of the skill premium. This leaves unchanged the fraction
of total labor allocated to each sector. So, when will human capital rise?
Lemma 2 As TFP in manufacturing, z, rises relative to agriculture, x, human capital, h,
increases and fertility, n,f a l l s .
Proof. Using a backdated version of (30), it is easy to calculate that the derivative of h











σ−1−1 > 0, (31)
since σ<1. Now, using (30), equation (21) may be rewritten as
n =
χ






















σ−1−1 < 0. (32)
9 The lefthand is based on (27). Equation (27) can be rewritten as
h0 =1− (x0/w0)1/(1−σ).
Hence, h0 is increasing in the unskilled wage, or equivalently the skilled wage using (23).
19The above lemma suggests that faster technological progress in the manufacturing sector,
relative to the agricultural sector, increases the demand for skilled labor and this triggers a
demographic transition and a rise in educational attainment. This accords well with U.S.
historical experience.
What happens in the very long run?
Lemma 3 As z/x →∞ , the agricultural sector vanishes or h → 1 and fertility declines to
its lower bound, n∗ = χ/[(ψ + χ)(τ + φ)].
Proof. From equation (30), backdated, it is easy to see that h → 1 as z/x →∞ .
Further, equation (21) implies that n → n∗ = χ/[(ψ + χ)(τ + φ)].
Asymptotically, agriculture’s share of GDP goes to zero as everyone in the economy
becomes skilled. The economy eventually converges to a steady state where population grows
at the constant rate n∗. One objection might be that, in reality, the ratio of manufacturing
TFP to agricultural TFP has only grown two-fold or so during the last 200 years, thereby
calling into question the importance of the above lemma. This is certainly true. A more
realistic setup would have agricultural and manufacturing goods entering the utility function
separately, with agricultural goods having a lower income elasticity of demand. As incomes
rise, identical increases in z and x will reduce the demand for agricultural goods relative to
manufacturing goods, at least in a closed economy. This creates an additional channel for
structural transformation. Now, what can be said about the dynamics of human capital and
fertility as z rises relative to x? Lemma 2 provides a characterization.
Lemma 4 Human capital h is convex in z/x when z/x < [ωσ/(2 − σ)]1−σ =( z/x)
∗,a n di s
concave otherwise.































The above lemma indicates that when incomes are low, human capital will increase at an
increasing rate when z/x rises. After a certain point, the rate of increase in human capital
will slow down, and human capital will increase at a decreasing rate as z/x rises. Thus, the
convergence of h from a society where every individual is unskilled (h =0 )to one in which
every one is skilled (h =1 )will have an S shape that is characteristic of the diﬀusion of many
innovations. Now, recall that fertility is inversely related to human capital. Consequently,
fertility will initially fall at a increasing rate, and then will eventually decline at an decreasing
rate as it converges to n∗. The following corollary characterizes the dynamics of fertility.
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Figure 8 illustrates the dynamics of the transition path. One interesting aspect of the
ﬁgure, as is evident from the above lemma and corollary, is that the point of inﬂection
associated with the dynamics of fertility occurs at a lower value of z/x than does the cor-
responding number for human capital; i.e., (z/x)
∗∗ < (z/x)
∗. This implies that the decline








Figure 8: The Dynamics of Fertility and Human Capital
with the evidence in the United States. What creates this asymmetry between the fall in
fertility and the rise in human capital? The answer is the skill premium. Note that when
the skill premium is zero, which transpires when φ =0 , (z/x)
∗∗ =( z/x)
∗ . The analysis thus
implies that economies with a higher skill premium will experience a longer delay between
the slowdowns in the decline in fertility and the rise in human capital.
A numerical example will help clarify the ability of the model to match the historical
facts.
Example 3 (The U.S. Demographic Transition) Assume the parameter values given
below.
Tastes: β =0 .9420,χ=0 .5,ψ=1− 0.5.
Technology: σ =0 .8.
Child care: τ =0 .123,φ=0 .4.
The time is 1800. Assume that (z/x)1800 =2 .36. Then, equation (30) implies that h1800 =
0.05; i.e., about 5 percent of the population are skilled. The rest of the population, 95 percent,
live in the rural sector. Further, equation (21) implies that n1800 = χ/[(ψ + χ)(τ+φh1800)] =
3.5, which is exactly the number of kids per adult (male plus female) in 1800. An aver-
age married couple in 1800 had 7 kids. Now, move ahead to 1940. TFP in agriculture
22grew by a factor of 1.95, while TFP in manufacturing grew by a factor of 4.11. Con-
sequently, (z/x)1940 =( 4 .11/1.95) × (z/x)1800 =4 .97. Now, equation (30) implies that
h1940 =0 .69, or that about 31 percent of the population live in the rural sector. Further,
n1940 = χ/[(ψ + χ)(τ + φh1940)] = 1.26, so that an average family has 2.52 children (as
opposed to 2.23 in the data). Finally, the long-run value of fertility is n∗ =0 .96. In the long
run an average family will give birth to 1.92 children.
Notice that even without employing any diﬀerences in curvature between manufacturing or
agricultural goods, or diﬀerences in the skill intensities associated with the production of
these goods, technological advance can account for most of the decline in fertility between
1800 and 1940.10
4 The Demise of Child Labor
Economically Valuable and Emotionally Worthless to Economically Worthless and Emotion-
ally Valuable: In 1896 the Southern Railroad Company of Georgia was sued for the wrongful
death of a two-year-old boy.11 The parents claimed that their son performed valuable
services worth $2 per month, “going upon errands to neighbors ... watching and amusing
... younger child.” The court’s judgement allowed just for minimum burial expenses to be
recovered. The ruling stated that the youngster was “of such tender years as to be unable
to have any earning capacity, and hence the defendant could not be held liable in damages.”
The problem was that the boy was too young to do productive work. And the court at-
tached no value to the pain and suﬀering connected with the loss of a child. An older child
c o u l de a r nm o n e y ,b u ti tw a ss t i l laf r a c t i o no fw h a ta na d u l tw o u l dg e t . F o re x a m p l e ,a
ten-year-old in 1798 could earn the equivalent of $22 a year working as a farm laborer, as
compared with $96 for an adult — Lebergott (1964, pp. 49-50).
10 Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) allow for agricultural and manufacturing goods to enter the utility
function separately. The assumed form of their utility function ensures that agricultural goods have a lower
income elasticity than do manufacturing goods. They show that a two-fold increase in z/x, together with a
lower income elasticity of demand for agricultural goods relative to skill-intensive manufactured goods, can
account for the demographic transition and the structural transformation that the United States experienced
over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
11 This and the next case are taken from Zelizer (1994, pp. 138-139). This is the source for the quotations
as well.
23Now move forward in time to January 1979. The New York State Supreme Court jury
awarded $750,000 to the parents of three-year-old William Kennerly. He had been given a
lethal dose of ﬂuoride in a city dental clinic. The twentieth century has witnessed a pro-
found transformation in the value of children. Along with the Second Industrial Revolution
emerged the “economically worthless” and the “emotionally priceless” child. For in strict
economic terms, today’s children are worthless to their parents. They are expensive. The
direct cost to a two-parent median income family of raising a child born in 1995 through to
the age of 17 was estimated to be $145,320.12 And this does not include college costs, time
costs, and foregone earnings. In return they provide no labor.
What caused this dramatic change in society’s valuation of children over such a relatively
short period of time? And what accounts for the apparent paradox that the value in the
twentieth century that society placed on an economically useless child far surpassed the one
in the nineteenth century that society placed on an economically useful child? A case can be
made that technological progress resulted in the liberation of children from work. Increased
mechanization of agriculture and manufacturing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries resulted in a decline in the demand for unskilled labor and a rise in the demand
for skilled labor. Thus, the return to skill rose. This created an incentive for parents both to
educate their oﬀspring more, and to have less of them; i.e., to substitute away from quantity
toward quality of children. The death of child labor was natural.
4.1 The Environment
The analysis here closely follows the setup of the previous section. Assume that an individual
lives for three periods: the ﬁrst as a child, and the second and third as an adult. In the ﬁrst
period of life a person undertakes no economic decisions; he simply accumulates the level of
human capital dictated by his parents. He begins the second period of his life with a ﬁxed
number of children, η. In addition to being exogenous, childbearing is costless. Skilling a
12 Source: Expenditures on Children by Families, 1995 Annual Report, USDA Miscellaneous Publication
Number 1528-1995.
24child, however, involves two costs. First, as before, there is the direct cost of educating the
child. In particular, endowing a child with h0 units of human capital involves a cost of φh0
units of unskilled time. Second, there is the opportunity cost of sending the child to school;
that is, by going to school a child forgoes some labor earnings. Speciﬁcally, suppose that a
child is as productive in the labor market as ζ<1 unskilled adults. Additionally, assume
that in order for the child to acquire h0 units of human capital he must go to school for h0
units of time.
A Young Adult’s Decision Problem: The economic environment is pretty much the same
as that in the previous section, with the above notable exceptions. Another distinction is
that a parent now cares about the leisure that his children will enjoy, in addition to his
own consumption and the quality of his children. The purpose is to break the link between












y =[ ( 1− h)w + hv + π + wζη(1 − h
0 − l) − wφηh
0]/(1 + β), (33)
where once again consumption when old, co0, has been substituted out using the Euler
equation (19). In this maximization problem, h denotes the human capital of the parent, h0
the human capital of the child, l the leisure time for the child, w the unskilled wage rate, v
the skilled wage rate, and π is the ﬂow of proﬁts associated with the operation of ﬁrms in
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.






w0(1 − h0)+v0h0. (34)
The righthand side of this equation gives the value from extra human capital accumulation
in children. It has the same form as (22). The lefthand side gives the cost of extra human
capital accumulation. Observe that part of this cost is the forgone earning wζ that a child
would realize by working instead of going to school. Also, the cost of educating kids is an
25increasing function of the number of kids, η. Hence, one would expect that as η falls h0
should rise. Note that an equiproportionate increase in v,v0,w,w 0 and cy will have no eﬀect
on h. Consequently, along a balanced growth path h will be constant. Hence, in order to
g e ts o m ea c t i o ni tm u s tt r a n s p i r et h a tv must rise relative to w,o re q u i v a l e n t l yt h a tz must
increase relative to x. Recall that this was exactly what was needed to account for the U.S.
demographic transition in Section 3.








The righthand side of this equation gives the marginal beneﬁt from providing an extra unit
of leisure to each child while the lefthand side gives the marginal cost. Observe that for
leisure, l, to increase, cy must rise relative to wη. This will happen if either v rises relative
to w, or if the level of human capital h increases, ceteris paribus. Note that a fall in fertility,
η, plays an important role in increasing l. When fertility declines, the marginal cost to the
parent of providing more leisure to each of his children falls, hence leisure rises.
4.2 Analysis
Imagine that the economy is resting in a steady state where z and x are constant.13
Variables such as h, l, w/cy,a n dv/cy will also be constant. Others such as the size of the
young generation, sy, will be changing at a constant rate dictated by the size of η.T h e
market-clearing condition for skilled labor will again be described by (26). The one for
unskilled labor will now appear as
u =[ 1− h +( 1− h − l)ηζ − φηh]. (36)
The ﬁrms’ problems are exactly the same as in Section 3.1. In a steady-state situation,
wages will be given by
w = w
0 = x[1 − h +( 1− h − l)ηζ − φηh]
σ−1 , (37)




which follow from equations (24), (25), (26), and (36).
In principle one can solve the ﬁrst-order conditions (34) and (35), in conjunction with
(37) and (38), to obtain a solution for h and l.14 General results are hard to obtain for this
economy, however, so a numerical example will be used to highlight the eﬀect of changes in
z/x and η on h.15 The goal of this example is to show that the above setup is capable of
generating a large decline in child labor. Little attention has been paid to its realism.
Example 4 (The Death of Child Labor) Assume the parameter values listed below.
Tastes: β =0 .9420,χ 1 =0 .14,χ 2 =0 .03,ψ=1− χ1 − χ2.
Technology: σ =0 .7.
Child care: φ =0 .1.
Child Productivity: ζ =0 .15.
Again, start oﬀ in 1800. Set η1800 =3 .5, since an average family gave birth to 7 children.
Observe that in work a child has the productivity of 0.15 adults.16 Assume that z1800 =
x1800 =1 . Then, equations (34) and (35) imply that h1800 =0 .025 and l1800 =0 .16;i . e . ,
about (1 − h1800 − l1800)×100 = 81.5 percent of children are gainfully employed. Now, move
ahead to 1940. TFP in agriculture grew by a factor of 1.95 while TFP in manufacturing
grew by a factor of 4.11. Consequently, (z/x)1940 =( 4 .11/1.95) × (z/x)1800 =2 .1. Also, let
η1940 =1 .1.N o w ,h1940 =0 .49 and l1940 =0 .51 so that no child works in 1940!
Child Labor Laws & Compulsory Schooling Laws: Child labor laws are often cited as a
reason for the decline in child labor. While the National Child Labor Committee was formed
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so that consumption is given by




{w[1 − h +( 1− h − l)ηζ − φηh]+vh}.
15 Analytical solutions can be obtained in Section 3 due to the fact that the costs of raising kids are
expressed as a fraction of family income. With child labor the convenience of this formulation disappears so
a more traditional one is adopted — compare (18) with (33).
16 Recall that according to Lebergott (1964), a child in agriculture could earn $22 in a year, while an adult
would receive 8 × 12 = $96. Assuming that the child would work from the age of 7, and given that a period
in the model is 20 years, the child equivalent of a man is (22/96) × (13/20) = 0.149.
27as early as 1904, it wasn’t until 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed, that
children were freed from the bondage of dangerous work. The data suggests that the process
of the withdrawal of children from the workforce had been completed before child labor laws
were ﬁrmly in place. The conventional wisdom among economic historians is that these laws
had little impact on teen attendance early in the twentieth century because the laws were
imperfectly enforced [Landes and Solmon (1972) and Eisenberg (1988)]. More recent work
by Margo and Finegan (1996) ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on school attendance when
compulsory schooling laws were coupled with child labor laws. There is still the possibility
that the enactment of these laws was a reaction to the greater demand for skilled labor, and
the lower demand for unskilled labor, caused by industrialization. Nardinelli (1990) echoes
this sentiment and provides conclusive evidence that those areas that industrialized ﬁrst
were also amongst the ﬁrst to adopt these laws. Hence the enactment of these laws in more
industrialized states is consistent with the notion that technological progress increased the
demand for skilled labor vis à vis unskilled labor and consequently reduced the demand for
child labor.
The above example suggests that sector-speciﬁc technological progress alone can account
for all of the decline in child labor. There are three eﬀects at play. First, the demand
for skilled labor rises relative to unskilled labor. This increases the skill premium, and
promotes investment in skill via a substitution eﬀect. Second, technological advance makes
parents wealthier. This income eﬀect makes parents more likely to invest in the well-being
of their children. Third, fertility drops also, which reduces the cost of educating a family.
Consequently, h and l both rise. A more serious treatment of the issue of child labor would
endogenize fertility and incorporate the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ that parents face. There is
one aspect of the data that make a technology-based explanation appealing. The period from
1900 to 1930 saw a dramatic decline in child labor. These three decades saw an enormous
increase in manufacturing productivity relative to agricultural productivity, z/x.T h eU n i t e d
States experience accords well with this implication. Last, observe that the utility ﬂow that
a parent realizes from a child increases with technological progress. This transpires because
28both the child’s level of human capital (or quality) and leisure rise.
5 Engines of Liberation
“Is it, then, consistent to hold the developed woman of this day within the
same narrow political limits as the dame with the spinning wheel and knitting
needle occupied in the past? No, no! Machinery has taken the labors of woman
as well as man on its tireless shoulders; the loom and the spinning wheel are but
dreams of the past; the pen, the brush, the easel, the chisel, have taken their
places, while the hopes and ambitions of women are essentially changed.”
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Solitude of Self," an address before United States
Congressional Committee on the Judiciary, January 18, 1892
“For ages woman was man’s chattel, and in such condition progress for her
was impossible; now she is emerging into real sex independence, and the resulting
outlook is a dazzling one. This must be credited very largely to progression in
mechanics; more especially to progression in electrical mechanics.
Under these new inﬂuences woman’s brain will change and achieve new ca-
pabilities, both of eﬀort and accomplishment.”
Thomas Alva Edison, as interviewed in Good Housekeeping Magazine,L V ,
no. 4 (October 1912, p. 440)
The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic rise in labor-force participation by married
women.17 It will be argued here that technological advance in the household sector liberated
women from the home, in particular from the oppressive burden of housework. The standard
Solow(1956)/Ramsey(1928) growth model will be extended along two dimensions. First,
17 Labor-force participation also increased for single women, but not as dramatically. For instance, 38.4
percent of single white women worked in 1890 — Goldin (1990, Table 2.1, p. 17). By 1988 this had risen to
68.6 percent.
29household production will be included in the framework. Second, a technology adoption
decision will be incorporated into the analysis.
Time Savings: As a backdrop to the subsequent analysis, a quick detour will be taken to
consider some evidence on the reduction of time spent on housework. At the start of Second
Industrial Revolution women’s magazines were ﬁlled with articles extolling the virtues of
appliances, the new domestic servants. For example, in 1920 an article in the Ladies’ Home
Journal entitled "Making Housekeeping Automatic" claimed that appliances could save a
4-person family 18.5 hours a week in housework — see Table 2. Some more scientiﬁc evidence
comes from the sociology literature — see Table 3. In 1924 a pair of famous sociologists,
Robert and Helen Lynd, studied a small town in Indiana, Middletown. They found that
87 percent of married women in 1924 spent 4 or more hours doing housework each day.
Zero percent spent less than 1 hour a day. The town was restudied by sociologists at two
later dates. By 1999 only 14 percent of married women spent more than 4 hours a day on
housework, and 33 percent spent less than 1 hour a day.
Table 2: estimated weekly hours saved by appliances
Task With Appliances Without Time Savings
Breakfast 7 10 3
Luncheons 10.5 14 3.5
Dinners 10 12 2
Dishwashing and Clearing 10.5 15.75 5.25
Washing and Ironing 6.5 9 2.5
Marketing and Errands 6 6 0
Sewing and Mending 3.5 4 0.5
Bed Making 2.75 3.5 0.75
Cleaning and Dusting 2 3 1
Cleaning Kitchen and Refrigerator 2 2 0
Total 60.75 79.25 18.5
Source: Ladies’ Home Journal (1920)
30Table 3: Daily Housework in Middletown
(Percentage of married housewives in each category)
Year ≥ 4h o u r s 2t o3h o u r s ≤ 1h o u r
1924 87 13 0
1977 43 45 12
1999 14 53 33
Source: Caplow, Hicks and Wattenberg (2001, p. 37)
5.1 The Environment
Consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations.18 Individuals live
for two periods, they work in the ﬁrst period and retire in the second. They are endowed
w i t ho n eu n i to ft i m ef o re i t h e rw o r k i n gi nt h em a r k e to ra th o m e .
Tastes: The lifetime utility function for a young adult is given by
µlnc
y +( 1− µ)lnn
y + βµlnc
o0 + β(1 − µ)lnn
o0, (39)
where cy and co0 denote the individual’s consumption when young and old, and (with a
change in notation from the previous sections) ny and no0 now stand for young and old
household production.
Income: Young adults work for the market wage, w. They save for old age at the
internationally determined time-invariant gross interest rate r.
Household Production Technology: Let the production of home goods, n,b eg o v e r n e db y
n =[ θδ
κ +( 1− θ)h
κ]
1/κ , for κ ≤ 1,
where δ is the stock of household capital and (with another change in notation) h now
represents the amount of time spent on housework. When κ>0 (κ<0), capital and labor
are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes (complements) in producing utility.19 Finally, assume
18 The framework developed below is a stripped-down version of Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu
(2002).
19 Let
U(δ,h) ≡ (1 − µ)ln{[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ]
1/κ}.
31that household capital is lumpy or indivisible. A person acquires this capital when young
and keeps it for his entire life, whereupon it fully depreciates. Let the time cost of purchasing
δ units of household capital be q.
The Young Household’s Choice Problem: Since the agent spends the entire one unit of
his time endowment during retirement on household production, ho0 =1 . Consequently,
no0 =[ θδ
κ +( 1− θ)]
1/κ, a constant. The decision problem facing a young adult is
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Since there is only one h to worry about, let hy = h from here on out to save on notation.
The function U is the household’s indirect utility function. It gives the maximal level of
utility that the household can attain given the prices w, r and q, and the level of household
capital δ. Note the above problem presumes that the household purchases the household
production technology represented by the pair (δ,q). This assumption will be relaxed later
on.





κ +( 1− θ)h
κ]
1
κ−1 (1 − θ)h
κ−1. (43)
This above equation can be derived by using (41) and (42) to substitute out for cy and
ny in (40) and then diﬀerentiating with respect to h. T h el e f t h a n ds i d eg i v e st h em a r g i n a l
cost of an extra unit of housework. An extra unit of time spent in housework comes at
the expense of a forgone unit of market work that earns the wage rate, w.T oc o n v e r tt h i s
into utility terms, multiply by the marginal utility of consumption when young, µ/cy. The
It is easy to see that
U12(δ,h) Q 0 as κ R 0.
32righthand side represents the marginal beneﬁt from an extra unit of housework. An addi-
tional unit of time spent at home increases household production by the marginal product
of labor, [θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ]
1
κ−1 (1 − θ)hκ−1. To convert this to utility terms, multiply by the
marginal utility of home goods, (1 − µ)/ny. At the optimum, the marginal cost and beneﬁt
of housework must equal each other.
The Euler equation for consumption is exactly the same as equation (19), which together
with the budget constraint (41) gives
c
y =




βrw[(1 − h) − q]
1+β
. (44)
Now, using (42) and (44) to substitute out for cy and ny in (43), while rearranging, yields a




(1 − h) − q
[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ]
(1 − θ)h
κ−1. (45)
The intuition underlying this equation will be presented later on.





where k and l are the inputs of capital and labor used in production and z is the level of
productivity in the market sector. Now, suppose that capital depreciates fully after use in
production. The rental rate on capital will therefore be r, since it must yield the same return
as a bond. Given this production structure, once again wages will be given by (9).
5.2 Analysis
What is the eﬀect of technological advance in the home sector on the amount of time devoted
to housework? The answer will depend upon whether capital and labor in household pro-
duction are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes or complements in generating utility. Likewise,
what impact will technological progress in the market sector have on the amount of time
allocated to housework?
33Lemma 5 An increase in the market wage rate, w, will have no eﬀect on the amount of
time spent in housework, h, while an increase in the stock of household capital, δ,w i l l
(a) cause h to decline when capital and labor are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes (or when
κ>0),
(b) cause h to increase when capital and labor are Edgeworth-Pareto complements (or when
κ<0),
(c) have no eﬀect on h when capital and labor are neither Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes or
complements (or when κ =0 ).
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the lemma is trivial since w doesn’t enter equation (45) and
therefore cannot inﬂuence h. To establish the second part of the lemma, totally diﬀerentiate




[(1 − h) − q]hθδ
κ−1
{(1 − q)[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ] − κ(1 − h − q)θδ
κ}
.
Now, the denominator of the above expression is unambiguously positive since κ ≤ 1 and





Corollary Technological progress in the market sector, or an increase in z,h a sn oe ﬀect on
the time spent in housework, h.
Proof. The proof is trivial since z does not enter (45), because w doesn’t.










The lefthand side of this above equation is the marginal product of labor in the market
sector, w. T h i si sp o r t r a y e db yt h eWW curve in Figure 9. The value of the marginal
product of labor in the home sector is given by the righthand side. This equals the marginal
product of labor in the home sector, [θδ
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Figure 9: The Eﬀect of an Improvement in Household Technology on Time Spent on House-
work
(implicit) relative price of home goods, [(1 − µ)/µ]cy/ny. Substituting out for cy and ny,




w[(1 − h) − q]
[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ]1/κ × [θδ
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The righthand side of the equation spells out the demand curve for housework, h.I t ’ s
s h o w ni nF i g u r e9b yt h eDD curve. This curve is decreasing in h, a fact easily deduced by
observing that both the price and marginal product terms are decreasing in h.N o t e t h a t
RHS(h;δ,w) →∞as h → 0,a n dt h a tRHS(h;δ,w) → 0 as h → 1 − q.
The equilibrium level of housework, h∗, is given by the point where the DD and WW
curves intersect. So, how will technological advance in the home sector aﬀect the equilibrium






w[(1 − h) − q]
[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ]2(1 − θ)h
κ−1θδ









Figure 10: The Eﬀect of an Increase in Wages on Time Spent on Housework
Therefore, the demand curve for housework will shift down or up depending upon whether
labor and capital are substitutes (κ>0) or complements (κ<0)i nh o m ep r o d u c t i o n .
Figure 9 portrays the case where labor and capital are substitutes.
Now, let wages jump up by a factor of λ. It’s easy to deduce that the WW and DD
curves will also shift up by a factor of λ to W0W0 and D0D,a si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 0 .
Hence, the equilibrium level of housework remains unaﬀected. With logarithmic preferences
an increase in wages by a factor of λ will cause the consumption of market goods to increase
by the same factor, which leads in turn to an equiproportionate rise in the relative price of
home goods. Therefore, the value of marginal product curve shifts up by the factor λ.
Example 5 (Female Labor-Force Participation, 1900 and 1980) Assume the follow-
ing parameter values:
(i) Tastes, β =0 .9420,
(ii) Technology, θ =0 .33, κ =0 .5, q =0 .
In 1900 about 5 percent of married white females worked. Assume that none did. There are
about 224 non-sleeping hours available per couple in a week. If males worked a 40 hour week
then 1−h =4 0 /224 = 0.18 in 1900. Now, suppose that the amount of household capital in
1900 is negligible; i.e., set δ =0 . By using (45) it can be calculated that a value of µ =0 .145
is need to generate 1 − h =0 .18. Next, about 50 percent of white married women worked in
361980. Therefore, 1 − h =6 0 /224 = 0.27. From (45) it can be deduced that this value for
1 − h can be obtained by setting δ =1 .41. Thus, a rise in female labor-force participation
from zero to 50 percent can be generated by letting δ increase from 0 to 1.41.
A Technology Adoption Decision: Now suppose that the household faces a choice between
two household production technologies, namely a new versus an old one. Represent the new
technology by the pair (δ
1,q1),a n dt h eo l do n eb y(δ
2,q2). To make the problem interesting,
assume that δ
1 >δ
2 and q1 >q 2. The new technology oﬀers more capital services but costs
more. Characterizing the household’s adoption decision is straightforward:
Adopt new technology if U(w,r,δ
1,q1) >U(w,r,δ
2,q2),
Adopt old technology if U(w,r,δ
1,q1) <U(w,r,δ
2,q2),
Adopt either technology if U(w,r,δ
1,q1)=U(w,r,δ
2,q2).
Lemma 6 When capital and labor are Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes in household production
(0 <κ≤ 1), the adoption of a new household technology will be associated with a decline in
the amount of time spent on housework.





κ +( 1− θ)hκ]
{(1 − q)[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ] − κ(1 − h − q)θδ
κ}
< 0,
where again the denominator is positive since κ ≤ 1 and (1−q) ≥ (1−h−q). Second, it was
already established in Lemma 5 that sign(dh/dδ)=−sign(κ). The result is now immediate
since q1 >q 2 and δ1 >δ 2.
Often new technologies are prohibitively expensive when they are ﬁrst introduced. Hence,
they aren’t adopted initially. It’s clear that there exists some threshold price, q∗,a tw h i c ht h e







Lemma 7 The threshold price q∗ exists and is unique. Above the price q∗ the household will
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Figure 11: The Determination of the Threshold Price, q∗
Proof. It’s easy to deduce from (40) that
dU/dq = −µw/c
y < 0, (47)
and
dU/dδ =( 1− µ)θδ
κ−1{1/[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)h
κ]+β/[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)]} > 0. (48)
Equation (47) implies that the threshold price must be unique and that the household
will use the new technology for any price q1 <q ∗ and the old one for any price q1 >q ∗.
It is also easy to establish that the price q∗ exits. Clearly when q1 = q2 the household
will choose the new technology, since U(w,r,δ
1,q2) >U (w,r,δ
2,q2) by (48). Likewise,
U(w,r,δ
1,q1 ' 1) <U (w,r,δ
2,q 2) for q1 suﬃciently close to one, since at this high price
there will be no resources left over for market consumption. Hence, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem the threshold price q∗ must exist.
The situation described by the lemma is portrayed in Figure 11. So long as the price for
the new technology declines over time to the point q∗ households will eventually adopt it.
5.3 Analysis with Nondurable Household Products and Services
38Over the last 100 years or so there has been a dramatic rise in the number of labor-saving
nondurable household products and services. These goods and services economize on the
need for housework. For example, in 1900 the bulk of baked goods, or 92 percent, was made
at home.20 The average housewife is said to have baked more than 1/2 ton of bread a year.
S h es p e n to v e r2h o u r saw e e kb a k i n gg o o d s . 21 By 1965 this had dropped to 22 percent.
Similarly, 96 percent of vegetables purchased were unprocessed in 1900, as opposed to 30
percent in 1965.22 Per-capita consumption of canned fruits rose from 3.6 pounds in 1910
to 21.6 pounds in 1950.23 Think of the time saved cleaning, pealing, canning, or otherwise
preparing fruits and vegetables. There were about 2,100 packaged food products available
in 1980, compared with 10,800 today.24 Last, in 1900 only 5 percent of food expenditure
was on meals away from home. This had risen to 30 percent by 1987.25 To explore how
the introduction of new household products and services may promote female labor-force
participation, a static model of the household will be presented.
Setup: For tastes take a static version of (39), so that utility is given by
µlnc +( 1− µ)lnn, (49)
where c and n represent the individual’s consumption of market and home goods, respec-
tively. As before, the individual is endowed with one unit of time that he can use either
for market work, 1 − h,o rh o u s e w o r k ,h. Market work is compensated at the wage rate w.





κ +( 1− θ)h
κ]
1/κ, for κ ≤ 1, (50)
20 Source: Lebergott (1976, Table 1, p. 105).
21 Lebergott (1993, p. 81)
22 Again, see Lebergott (1976, Table 1, p. 105).
23 Source: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (1975, Series G 893).
24 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1998, Exhibit 3, p. 6).
25 Lebergott (1993, p.77).
39where di denotes the agent’s purchases of the i-th household product. Let the i-th household
product sell at price pi.T h e r ea r eN products available.
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Using this in (53), in conjunction with (51), yields a closed-form solution for h:
h =
(1 − µ)(1 − θ)
µ[θ
PN




Analysis: The upshot of the above discussion is now within easy grasp.
Lemma 8 An expansion in the number of household products and services, N,w i l lc a u s e
housework, h, to decrease and market work, 1 − h,t oi n c r e a s e .
Proof. It is trivial to see that (54) is decreasing in N.
40Lemma 9 A decline in the time price of the i-th household product, pi/w,w i l l
(a) cause housework, h, to decline when intermediates goods and labor are Edgeworth-Pareto
substitutes (or when κ>0),
(b) cause housework, h, to increase when intermediates goods and labor are Edgeworth-Pareto
complements (or when κ<0),
(c) have no eﬀect on housework, h, when intermediates goods and labor are neither Edgeworth-
Pareto substitutes or complements (or when κ =0 ).
Proof. Observe that Hκ
i and (pi/w)Hi are both decreasing or increasing in pi/w de-
pending on whether κ>0 or κ<0. The results follow.
Given the form of tastes (49) and the household production function (50), an increase in
the number of household products reduces the marginal product of housework (measured in
utility terms).26 Hence, housework declines. Likewise, a decline in time price of household
product i will lead to its increased use. When intermediates goods and housework are
Edgeworth-Pareto substitutes (complements) in utility this causes a fall (rise) in the marginal
product of housework (again denoted in utility terms). Housework again drops.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Technological progress has profoundly reshaped the economic landscape over the last 200
years. It’s easy to understand how the emergence of Watt’s steam engine, Crompton’s
cotton spinning mule, and Cort’s puddling and rolling process for iron transformed the
industrial landscape during the 1800’s. Likewise, it’s easy to appreciate how the introduction
of electricity, petrochemicals, and the internal combustion engine changed manufacturing in
the 1900’s. Less well understood, however, is the impact that technological advance has had
on the household sector. In 1800 the typical women labored in a rural home with 7, largely
uneducated, kids. Today she is almost certain to live in an urban area, likely to work in the
market sector, and have only two children who on average get 13 years of formal schooling.
Times have changed, and a little growth theory can go a long way toward understanding
this process.
26 I.e., the marginal product of housework multiplied by the marginal utility of home goods.
417 Literature Review
7.1 Fertility
The economics literature on fertility starts with Malthus (1798). He believed that an econ-
omy’s population had a natural size. This size was limited by the economy’s ﬁxed factors,
in particular land. A society’s population would increase, until its standard of living fell
down to a subsistence level, reigning in further expansion. When an economy’s population
exceeded its natural size either poverty stricken parents would voluntarily reduce their family
size or their family size would involuntarily decline due to famine induced disease.
Two classic papers on fertility in modern macroeconomics are by Razin and Ben-Zion
(1975) and Becker and Barro (1988). The Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) model is similar to the
setup presented in Section 2. They develop a small-open-economy overlapping-generations
model of fertility where kids simply enter their parents’ utility function in the same way
as other goods — say as in (1). The Becker and Barro (1988) model is more sophisticated,
but harder to work with. It’s an overlapping generations model, too, but now parents care
about the utility of their children in addition to the number of kids. Since a parent cares
about the happiness of his child who will in turn cares about happiness of his child (and
so on ad nauseam), the Becker and Barro (1988) model reformulates as an inﬁnitely-lived
representative agent model.
A milestone in the demographic transitions literature is a paper by Galor and Weil
(2000). Over the epochs of European history, fertility has followed a ∩-shaped pattern.
Galor and Weil (2000) develop a model of this pattern by combining elements of Malthus
(1798) and Razin and Ben-Zion (1975). They also allow for a human capital decision in
the spirit of Becker and Tomes (1986). In addition they make two key assumptions: ﬁrst,
technological progress is an increasing function of population size, and second, the return
on education rises with the rate of technological advance. In their framework, the world
rests in a Malthusian equilibrium for a long time. Per capita income remains more or less
constant over time. All increases in aggregate income induced by technological progress are
42absorbed by expansions in the population. As the population slowly grows bigger, the pace
of technological progress begins to pick up and the economy exits the Malthusian regime.
At ﬁrst parents use the extra income generated by technological advance to have more kids,
since the return on education is still low. As the rate of technological progress accelerates the
return to education rises, and parents choose to have fewer kids but invest more in them.27
A calibrated model that delivers a transition from Malthusian stagnation to growth,
accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility is presented in Doepke
(2001). The engine in his analysis is a Becker and Barro (1988) style model modiﬁed to
allow for parental human capital investment in children. He uses the model to study the role
of social policies in shaping the demographic transition of a country — more on this below.
Fernandez-Villaverde (2001) examines the ability of technological advance to explain,
quantitatively, the fall in British fertility. He uses a variant of the Becker and Barro (1988)
and Becker and Tomes (1986) frameworks to do this. In his analysis capital and skilled
labor are complements in the production. As the capital stock rises with economic develop-
ment, this creates an impetus for parents to substitute away from having a large number of
uneducated children toward having a small number of educated ones.
Little work has been done on the underlying cause of the baby boom. The best known
hypothesis is by Easterlin (1987). The generation that spawned the baby boom grew up
during the hard times of the Great Depression and World War II. As a result, this generation
had low material aspirations. They then entered the work force in the 1940’s and 1950’s,
a good time economically speaking. Given their low material aspirations, they used family
formation as an outlet for their earnings. This hypothesis is empirically ﬂawed on several
grounds.28 First, there was no break in the trend for fertility during the Great Depression.
Second, fertility in many OECD countries started to rise before the start of World War II.
27 Often the drop in fertility is attributed to a decline in child mortality. In some countries, such as the
France and the U.S., the decline in fertility proceeded the drop in child mortality. Doepke (2002) argues
within the context of a sequential fertility model with uncertainty about child mortality that the impact of
a decline in child mortality is likely to be small. That is, if the issue is child mortality, why would a woman
who already has some surviving children give birth to yet more children as is observed in the data.
28 The Easterlin hypothesis is critiqued in Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2002).
43Third, at the peak of the baby boom (1960) the most fertile cohort of women (those in the
20 to 24 year old age group) were simply too young for either the Great Depression or World
War II or to have had much of an impact on them — they were not alive during the Great
Depression and were less than 9 years old at the end of World War II.
7.2 The Economics of Household Production
T h ee c o n o m i ci m p o r t a n c eo fh o u sehold production was probably ﬁrst recognized in a classic
book by Reid (1934). Reid (1934, p. v) felt “that the productive work of the household
has been overlooked, even though more workers are engaged in it than any other single
industry.” She carefully reported and analyzed the uses of time and capital by households
of the era. The data was fragmentary then, and sadly still is. Reid (1934) knew in theory
that labor-saving household capital could reduce the amount of time spent on housework,
but the just emerging evidence at the time suggested that this eﬀect was modest (see Table
XIII, p. 91).
In a famous paper Becker (1965) develops the modern approach to household production:
the treatment of the household as a small factory or plant using inputs, such as labor, capital
and raw materials, to produce some sort of home goods. This is the notion underlying the
household production functions (2) and (42) used in Sections 2 and 5. Benhabib, Rogerson
and Wright (1991) introduce household production theory into a dynamic general equilibrium
model in order to study the movement of labor over the business cycle. The idea is that
in favorable economic times households may temporarily move labor out of the home sector
to take advantage of good market opportunities, thereby increasing the elasticity of labor
supply. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000) use a similar framework to investigate whether
household production can explain cross-country income diﬀerentials. This is very much in
the spirit of Reid (1934, p. 165), who observed that the “(g)oods resulting from household
production receive no market valuation ... .” She reports (p. 167) an estimate placing the
value of housewives’ services at $15.3 billion in 1918 compared with a national income of $61
billion. Last, Rios-Rull (1993) inserts household production into an overlapping generations
44model to examine its impact on the time allocations of skilled versus unskilled labor. In his
framework, skilled labor (relative to unskilled labor) will tend to substitute market goods or
services for labor in household production.
7.3 Structural Change
Two well-known models of structural change have been developed by Echevarria (1997)
and Laitner (2000). Laitner (2000) presents a closed-economy model with two sectors, viz
agriculture and manufacturing. Two key features of the analysis are that the demand for
agricultural goods has a zero income elasticity after a certain consumption level, and that
production in the agricultural sector is subject to technological progress. As the state of tech-
nology advances in the agricultural sector less labor is required to satisfy the ﬁxed demand
for agricultural goods. Echevarria (1997) develops a more general three-sector model, which
she solves numerically. Restrictions on tastes and technologies that allow for tractable solu-
t i o n st om o d e l sw i t hs t r u c t u r a lc h a n g ea r ed e veloped in Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001).
Caselli and Coleman (2001) study the process of regional convergence in the U.S. between
the agricultural South and manufacturing North. They argue that declining costs of edu-
cation, which allow the skills essential for manufacturing to be picked up more easily, play
an important role in explaining the pattern of convergence in wages between the South and
North. In particular, this latter feature allows convergence to obtain without a fall (in fact
with a rise) in farm, relative to nonfarm, wages. Last, in Western economies there has been
a secular shift in employment out of manufacturing into services. The growth of the service
sector in several European countries, however, has been encumbered by institutional rigidi-
ties. These services have been provided by the household sector instead. This phenomena
is analyzed by Rogerson (2002).
Now, the model presented in Section 3 has a single good that can be produced by one or
both of two sectors, interpreted as agriculture and manufacturing. The pace of technological
progress is assumed to be faster in the latter sector. This draws labor into manufacturing.
A similar assumption is made in Hansen and Prescott (2002) who model the transition from
45the pre-industrial to the modern era. Grafted onto the model developed in Section 3 is a
fertility decision à la Razin and Ben-Zion (1975). Also overlaid onto the framework is a
human capital decision along the lines of Becker and Tomes (1986). Here parents care about
the earnings that their kids will make, as in the Galor and Weil (2000) framework, however;
as opposed to the level of their human capital — see (17).
It’s easy to modify the framework developed in Section 3 to allow for two types of goods in
tastes, agricultural and manufactured. By endowing agricultural goods with a lower income
elasticity than manufactured ones an extra channel for structural change can be added.29
In fact, a similar device is already employed in the model of the baby bust and baby boom
in Section 2. Observe that the term c > 0 in (1) operates to lower the income elasticity of
children relative to market goods. As income rises a parent switches resources away from
children toward the consumption of market goods. [Interestingly, Jones (2001) sets c < 0.
This raises the income elasticity of children relative to market goods. Hence, fertility will
be low when a person is poor. Jones (2001) uses this to generate the lefthand side of the
∩-shaped pattern in fertility. The righthand side obtains by assuming an isoelastic utility
function in consumption, (c + c)ρ/ρ (for ρ ≤ 1), that is less curved than ln(c + c) in c + c;
i.e., by picking ρ>0.30 Therefore, at high levels of income, as income rises the marginal
utility of consumption falls slower than the marginal utility of kids. This generates a decline
in fertility.]
7.4 Child Labor
Both demographers and economists have long stressed the economic value of children in
societies. Adam Smith (1973, p. 173) said, when speaking of colonial America,
“Labour there is so well rewarded that a numerous family of children, instead
of being a burden, is a source of opulence and prosperity to the parents. The
29 The interested reader can see Greenwood and Seshadri (2002).
30 See also Greenwood and Seshadri (2002).
46labour of each child, before it can leave their house, is computed to be worth a
hundred pounds clear gain to them.”
Likewise Gary Becker (1960, p. 213) states
“It is possible that in the mid-nineteenth century children were a net producer’s
good, providing rather than using income.”
Noted demographer John Caldwell (1982) has argued that there are two types of societies:
pre-transitional and post-transitional. The former are characterized by net ﬂows from chil-
dren to parents while the latter are characterized by net ﬂows in the opposite direction —
some of the ﬂows from children to parents may be in the form old-age support for the latter.
[For an application of the Caldwell hypothesis to the demographic transition literature, see
Boldrin and Jones (2002)].
Now suppose that the net present value of a kid is positive and that the prime motivation
for having children is wealth maximization. Then fertility rates should be close then to their
biological maximum. This doesn’t seem to have been observed. While children undoubtedly
made important contributions to the family income, as these quotes attest, most historical
research suggests that it would have been very unlikely that the net present value of children
could have been positive. Economic historian Nardinelli (1990) presents a comprehensive
review of the literature on the cost of children and argues that it is extremely unlikely that
children were capital goods. Economic demographer Mueller (1976) has shown that even
under the most plausible assumptions, the net worth of children in peasant societies is nega-
tive and concludes “(i)n sum, the aggregate model and the life-cycle model agree in showing
that children have negative economic value in peasant agriculture" (p. 145). The huge liter-
ature on slavery provides a clearer picture on the productivity of child labor in preindustrial
societies. Fogel and Engerman (1974, p. 153) report that “prior to age twenty-six, the
accumulated expenditures by planters on slaves were greater than the average accumulated
income which they took from them.” While critics have questioned their estimated rates of
return, even higher estimates do not make children proﬁtable in the short run. And surely
47if slave children had negative net worth, it seems likely that free children in agricultural
societies would have had negative value. The basic problem is that children can earn very
little for the ﬁrst decade or so of their lives. Yet, they must be maintained. Discounting
makes it diﬃcult to overcome the front-end costs of raising children.31
Now, even if the net-present value of a child’s earnings to his parents is negative the
possibility of child labor may signiﬁcantly defray the cost of bearing him or increase the
cost of educating him — as is evident from the ﬁrst-order condition (34). As such, it can
still have a big inﬂuence on an adult’s fertility decision, as well as on a parent’s decision
about educating his child. Doepke (2001) examines the impact that child labor laws and
educational subsidies may have on fertility and growth — note that compulsory schooling
laws can eﬀectively limit child labor as well as subsidize schooling. Both policies operate to
promote a higher level of human capital investment and faster fertility decline. Surprisingly,
ruling out child labor turns out to be much more eﬀective than subsidizing education in
speeding up the demographic transition from high to low fertility. Hazan and Berdugo
(2002) also argue that outlawing child labor expedites this transition process.
Last, in the model presented in Section 4 a rise in the demand for skilled labor leads to
a decline in the use of child labor. If family size was variable, as in Section 3, then smaller
families would result too. Doepke and Zilibotti (2003) use this mechanism to model the
enactment of child labor laws as a country develops. Child labor substitutes in production
for unskilled adult labor. Therefore, on this hand, unskilled adult labor gains from outlawing
child labor. On the other hand, unskilled adults will earn income by letting their children
work. At early stages of economic development most adults will be unskilled and families
will be large. There will not be much support for child labor laws. Now, suppose that the
return to skill rises over time due to economic development. As more and more unskilled
families choose to have fewer children, and to educate them, the political equilibrium shifts
to favoring a ban on child labor.
31 Still, if there is no good abode for savings in a society, then children may be better than nothing in
providing for old age.
487.5 Female Labor-force Participation
The economic analysis of female labor-force participation began with the pioneering works
of Mincer (1962) and Cain (1966). The massive rise in female labor-force participation
over the course of the 20th century has attracted a lot of notice from labor economists.
Much attention has been devoted to examining the extent to which the rise in real wages
and the narrowing of the gender gap can account for the rise in labor-force participation.
The narrowing of the gender gap has been analyzed by Blau and Kahn (2000) and Goldin
(1990). Galor and Weil (1996) provide an interesting general equilibrium model in which
the increase in women’s wages and labor-force participation is a by-product of the process of
development where capital accumulation raises women’s wages relative to men’s wages. The
underlying mechanism is that capital is more complementary to women’s labor than it is to
men’s labor. Consequently capital accumulation will lead to greater increases in women’s
wages than men’s wages. In a similar vein, Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) argue
that decreases in the gender wage gap can account for increases in average hours worked by
married females for the time period between 1950 and 1990.
It is easy to introduce the gender gap in the framework developed in Section 5. Recall
that the model implies that a general increase in wages will have no eﬀect on labor-force
participation. This is proved in Lemma 5 and is easy to see from equations (43) and (44).
Ar i s ei nw will lead to an equiproportionate increase in cy and hence will have no impact





=0 .5w + φw(0.5 − h) − wq.
Here φ represents the gender gap, or the ratio of female to male wages. Males and females
each have a time endowment of 0.5. Males are presumed always to work full time. Females
can vary their market labor supply, 0.5−h.T h ee ﬃciency condition for h will once again be
given by (43), but now the lefthand side will be multiplied by φ.I ti se a s yt od e d u c et h a t
49an increase in φ will lead to an increase in h,s i n c ecy will rise by less than φ.32 Observe
that unlike the Galor and Weil (1996) setup, but like the Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan
(2003) one, the gender gap is taken to be exogenous.
Empirically speaking, the gender gap did not move much between 1930 and 1980. More
speciﬁcally, data from Blau and Kahn (2000) suggest that between 1955 and 1980, the period
associated with enormous increases in the labor force participation rate, the gap remained
almost constant.33 In 1969, the female-to-male weekly wage ratio was 0.56 and this number
rose to merely 0.58 by 1979 [see Blau (1998, Table 4, p. 129)]. Unless labor supply elasticities
for women are quite high, the narrowing down of the gender gap can only be a small part of
the explanation. Additionally, the gender gap may have narrowed dramatically between 1820
and 1880 [Goldin (1987, Figure 3, p. 215)] with probably little rise in married female labor-
force participation (given the very low rate in 1890). All of this suggests that something else
was going on, in addition to the narrowing of the gender gap, which led women to enter the
labor force, such as the introduction of labor-saving household goods. On this, perhaps the
introduction of such goods increased the elasticity of female labor supply. Intriguingly, the
data suggest that for the 1900-1930 period married women’s uncompensated wage elasticities
of labor-force participation were close to zero, while in the middle of the century women’s
uncompensated wage elasticities were quite high - as high as 1.5 in some studies.34
An interesting and related development fact is that female labor-force participation is U-
shaped over the course of economic development — see Goldin (1995). The U-shaped pattern
is very prominent in the cross-section. She believes that the trough of the U for the U.S. was
reached around 1920. A simple modiﬁcation of the model introduced in Section 5 can be used
32 Note that equation (44) will change to
cy =
w[0.5+φ(0.5 − h) − q]
1+β
.
33 In fact the gender pay gap increased between 1955 and 1968 [see Blau and Kahn (2000, Figure 1, p.
76]. The gender gap did narrow considerably in the period after 1980.
34 See Goldin (1990, Table 5.2, p. 132).
50to account for the U shape. Imagine adding a subsistence consumption constraint. When
incomes are very low and consumption is below subsistence, women go out to work in order
to achieve the subsistence level of consumption. As incomes rise with technological advance
i nt h em a r k e ts e c t o r ,t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect associated with easing the subsistence constraint
dominates the substitution eﬀect (holding ﬁxed the household production function) and
time spent in the paid labor force decreases. In other words, the declining portion of the
U associated with the pre-1920 era can be accounted for. After 1920 the introduction of
labor-saving appliances associated with technological progress in the home sector could have
led to more women entering into the workforce. Thus, growth theory can go a long way
toward accounting for the entire time path of married female labor-force participation over
the course of economic development.
There are other explanations of the rise in female labor-force participation. The eﬀect of
World War II has received some attention, for instance. Goldin (1991) investigates the eﬀects
of WWII on women’s labor-force participation and ﬁnds that a little over half of the women
who entered the labor market during the War years exited by 1950. Another possibility is
that attitudes toward working women might have changed considerably and this encouraged
w o m e nt oe n t e ri n t ot h ep a i dl a b o rf o r c e . W h i l et h i si sh a r dt ok n o w ,o n ec a nl o o ka t
social surveys across time to gain a better understanding. After reviewing public opinion
poll evidence, Oppenheimer (1970, p. 51) concludes “it seems unlikely that we can attribute
much of the enormous postwar increases in married women’s labor force participation to a
change in attitudes about the propriety of their working.” On this, Fernandez, Fogli and
Olivetti (2004) present evidence suggesting that a man is more likely to have a working
wife if his own mother worked than if she didn’t. In particular, men who had mothers who
worked in World War II had a higher likelihood of marrying working women than those
who didn’t. They development a model where attitudes toward working women become
more receptive over time. This idea complements those set out in Section 5. The famous
sociologist William F. Ogburn hypothesized that culture and social institutions evolve, often
with a lag, to technological progress in the economy (or presumably to other events such as
51wars). Ogburn (1964, p. 85) said
"Unlike the natural environment, the technological environment is a huge
mass in rapid motion. It is no wonder then that our society with its numerous
institutions and organizations has an almost impossible task in adjusting to this
whirling technological environment. It should be no surprise to sociologists that
the various forms and shapes which our social institutions take and the many
shifts in their function are the result of adjustments — not to a changing natural
environment, not to a changing biological heritage — but to adaptations to a
changing technology."
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[1 + ω(z/x)1/(σ−1)](1/(σ − 1))τω(z/x)1/(σ−1)−1
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578.2 Supporting calculations for Lemmas 5 and 6
Write equation (45) as
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.
Clearly, the denominator of the above expression is always positive, since 1 − q ≥ 1 − h − q










κ +( 1− θ)hκ]
{(1 − q)[θδ
κ +( 1− θ)hκ] − κ(1 − h − q)θδ
κ}
< 0,
where again the denominator of the above expression is always positive, since 1−q ≥ 1−h−q
and κ ≤ 1.
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